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Abstract
This paper analyzes labor market success of workers who are displaced in boom
versus recession periods. Moreover, the empirical analysis contrasts workers from
small firms and large firms. The idea is that displacement carries no information
about workers’ productivity in large firms but is a signal of low productivity in small
firms. This signal is stronger when the plant closure occurs in a boom period than
in a recession period. Results indicate that the (i) state of the business cycle is
important for influence the effect of displacement on labor market success and (ii)
the effect differs by the size of the firm. In large firms, displaced workers suffer from
larger earning losses when displacement occurs in recession compared to boom, the
opposite result is found for workers displaced from small firms.
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”Capitalism without bankruptcy
is like Christianity without hell.”
Frank Borman, retired NASA astronaut
1 Introduction
All of Switzerland was paralyzed by the grounding of Swissair, our national airline. We
were shorn of the illusion that the white cross on the logo of our airline stood for stability
and security. Nearly everyone around Zurich knows someone who was affected by the
grounding of Swissair. Fortunately the government and the economy reacted, for Swiss
circumstances, very rapidly by providing billions to build up a new airline out of the
remains of Swissair. In doing so further negative consequences could be avoided, such
as the potential demise of many intermediate firms dependent on Swissair.
For decades, economists and politicians alike have concerned themselves with the
problem of workers loosing their jobs due to events beyond their control. Displaced
workers suffer substantial earnings losses after a plant closure (e.g. Flaim and Sehgal,
1985; Hamermesh, 1989; Addison and Portugal, 1989; Ruhm, 1991). Because of the loss
of firm-specific human capital, internal wages lie above alternative wages (Hamermesh,
1987). The earnings losses of displaced workers even hold in the long run (Jacobson
et al., 1993; Stevens, 1997). Contrary to workers who have been laid-off, a worker’s
displacement does not signal that he is less productive. Displaced workers have higher
re-employment wages and shorter unemployment spells than laid-off workers (Gibbons
and Katz, 1991). The idea behind this signaling hypothesis is that an individual worker
is unlikely to have contributed to a plant closure, whereas being laid off is seen as a sign
of low productivity.
This chapter proposes that the individual contribution to a plant closure and thus
the signal about a worker’s productivity is not necessarily insignificant and it depends
on the size of the former employer and the business cycle. In general, this chapter argues
first, that the probability that a plant closure is driven by a negative demand shock is
larger in recessions than in booms and second, that firm performance is closely related to
the effort exerted by an individual worker in small firms but not in large firms. Consider
an economy with a asymmetric flow of information, where the workers’ productivity is
not observable to the employer. A new employer of a displaced worker would have no
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information about this workers’ productivity besides the fact that his previous employer
has closed down. Consider furthermore that this worker’s previous firm was a one-man
company that went bankrupt in an economic environment which was steadily improving.
In this extreme example it seems natural that the individual contribution of this single
worker to the plant closure cannot be ignored from the labor market. The question is:
what does the new employer learn about the productivity of the worker, when his only
information is that the worker’s previous firm has gone bankrupt? This chapter argues
that when a worker who was displaced from a small firm is looking for a new job in a
boom period, the new employer infers that the worker is of low productivity. Workers
displaced from a large firm or during a recession period do not carry such a negative
signal.
The empirical analysis will contrast earnings losses for workers displaced in a boom
from workers displaced in a recession and furthermore distinguish between workers dis-
placed from small firms and large firms. This chapter will use workers who have been dis-
placed from large firms as a benchmark, where individuals’ contribution to the plant clo-
sure and thus the signal on workers productivity is almost zero. Because re-employment
real wages are lower in a recession than in a boom (Dunlop, 1938; Tarshis, 1939; Baker
et al., 1994; Barlevy, 2001), workers getting displaced from large firms should suffer
larger earnings losses when the plant closure occurs in a recession than in a boom. This
argument also applies to small firms. In addition, workers who have been displaced from
small firms also carry a negative signal because they would have had more influence on
the success of the firm. One would expect that this negative signal should be worse in a
boom than in a recession and thus induce larger earnings losses when the plant closure
occurs in a boom. The net effect of the business cycle on future earnings for workers
getting displaced from small firms is ambiguous.
The empirical analysis is based on a large administrative data set covering all Aus-
trian private sector workers and their quarterly (un)-employment and earnings history
from 1972 to 2001. A unique feature of the data is that by observing the size of the
firm over time the exact date of each plant closure can be determined, this allowing one
to compare earnings losses of workers displaced in a boom with workers displaced in a
recession. Additionally, plant closing is observed at the firm level, which allows one to
contrast large plant closure firms from small plant closure firms.
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The main results of this chapter are, first, that workers getting displaced from large
firms suffer larger earnings losses when they get displaced at the beginning of a recession
period rather than at the beginning of a boom period. Separating the earnings effects
into a wage and an unemployment effect results indicate that the probability of finding a
new job after displacement is larger in a boom than in a recession. Wages are, however,
not affected. Thus the large earnings losses in the recession period are driven by the
accordingly larger fraction of unemployed displaced workers. These findings for workers
displaced from large firms holds true during the entire post-displacement time period
of six years. Second, workers who have been displaced from small firms experience
significantly higher declines in earnings when they lose their job at the beginning of a
boom period. This is in contrast to the findings for the large firms. Differences in the
earnings losses between boom and recession are largely driven by the wages. Workers
displaced from small firms suffer substantially larger declines in wages when the plant
closure occurs at the beginning of a boom period. The probability of finding a new job
after displacement is hardly affected by the business cycle. Third, there are no significant
differences in pre-displacement earnings between boom and recession, neither for large
firms nor for small firms. Thus the difference findings for the earnings losses during a
boom versus a recession are not driven by ex-ante heterogeneity of workers and firms.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a short overview of related
literature. Section 3 presents the data source and defines the sample of plant closure
workers and the control sample of non plant closure workers respectively. Further, this
section gives a short descriptive comparison of the earnings losses during a boom versus
a recession, separately for workers displaced from large firms and workers displaced from
small firms. Section 4 introduces different measures to capture the losses due to a plant
closure and presents the statistical models used in this chapter. The results are shown
and discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
There are many studies analyzing long-term earnings losses of displaced workers. One
of the most exhaustive studies is one from Jacobson et al. (1993). The authors use
longitudinal data containing quarterly earnings histories for a large number of high
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tenure displaced and non-displaced workers from Pennsylvania, extending from 1974 to
1986. The authors find significant long-term earnings losses for the five years following
the plant closure for high tenure workers. Further, they find that the earnings losses of
displaced workers begin mounting before their displacement and depends only minimally
on their age and sex. Jacobson et al. (1993) also find strong evidence that the earnings
losses depend on the local labor market conditions. Workers displaced in a region with
weak labor market conditions suffer higher earnings losses than workers displaced in
a region with better labor market conditions. Stevens (1997) finds for the U.S. , in
connection with a national data set based on a survey, that even six or more years after
the plant closure displaced workers’ earnings lie significantly below their expected levels.
Further, she shows that a big part of these earnings losses can be explained by additional
job losses following an initial displacement. Bender et al. (2002) compare, among other
things, the wage profile of displaced workers after their job loss with the wages they
earned right before the plant closure, using French and German data. In Germany,
displaced workers earn significantly less in the three years after the plant closure but
the earnings loss becomes insignificant after four years. In France, displaced workers
earn even more in the first three years after the plant closure than directly before the
plant closure. One explanation could be that high-wage workers find a new job earlier.
The earnings difference becomes insignificant after four years as well. Thus, in contrast
to the results from Jacobson et al. (1993) the earnings losses in France and Germany
disappear in the long run. The reason for this may be the much more regulated labor
markets in France and Germany, compared to in the United States.
Gibbons and Katz (1991) offer another approach by comparing the labor market
success of plant closure workers with laid-off workers. They provide a theoretical and
an empirical analysis of an asymmetric information model of layoffs. The idea behind
their paper is that employers have private information concerning their employees’ pro-
ductivity and they are able to choose who to lay off. Accordingly, the market infers that
laid-off workers are of low productivity and offers them lower wages in their next job. In
other words, laid-off workers carry a negative signal concerning their productivity. The
authors assume that workers displaced by a plant closure, in contrast, carry no signal
concerning to their productivity, because the worker’s individual contribution to the
plant closure of a firm is negligible. Therefore the authors predict higher re-employment
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wages for plant closure workers than for laid-off worker. They confirm this prediction
using the 1984-1986 Displaced Workers Survey (DWS) as a supplement of the Current
Population Survey (CPS).
There is further literature which analysis either the effect of the business cycle or the
effect of the size of the former employer. While not distinguishing between small firms
and large firms, Nakamura (2004) develops a theoretical model in which displacement
arises from a combination of selection and bad luck. The idea is that in every period
some workers get laid off due to their low productivity, while the number of laid off
workers due to bad luck would be higher during a recession. The proportion of workers
who are laid off due to their low productivity would thus be larger during a boom.
This implies that workers who get laid off in a recession are, on average, less adversely
selected than those laid off during a boom. If the productivity of a worker is not
observable to employers and the signaling effect varies over time, wage losses should also
vary over time. Using the DWS as a supplement to the CPS she finds that the overall
unemployment rate at the time of the job displacement has a significant positive effect
on individuals’ earnings losses. Farber (2005) also finds strong evidence that earnings
losses of displaced workers are pro-cyclical to the business cycle. Also using the DWS
and the CPS he finds earnings losses of about 7% during a recession as opposed to
earnings losses of about 17% during a boom. Winter-Ebmer (2001) shows, using a large
Austrian administrative data set, that larger firms not only pay higher wages but also
offer more stable employment conditions. Krashinsky (2002) shows, using the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, that the difference between earnings losses of laid off
workers compared with those of displaced workers found by Gibbons and Katz (1991)
becomes insignificant after controlling for the size of the former and the new employer.
Farber (1996), Kletzer (1998) and Abbring et al. (2002) investigate the effect of the
business cycle on the displacement rate. For displaced workers, defined as permanent
layoffs, the displacement rate is more or less anti-cyclical to the business cycle. The
displacement rate, which includes only those workers displaced due to a plant closure,
shows little variation over time.
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3 Data and Descriptive Analysis
3.1 Data
The data source for the empirical analysis in this chapter is the ”Austrian Social Security
Database” (ASSD1), which contains detailed information about individuals’ employment–
unemployment– and earnings–history and several demographic characteristics such as
age, gender, and broad occupation. The ASSD also contains detailed information on
the employer, such as the size of the firm, the geographical location and the industry
affiliation. The data set is unique in the following respects: first, one can exactly deter-
mine the date of a plant closure and thus precisely analyze workers’ earnings losses over
time. Second, one can observe plant closure at the firm level, allowing one to distinguish
between small firms and large firms. This allows one to also control for firm specific
characteristics in addition to individual worker’s characteristics.
Individual earnings are available as earned income per workday. Earnings are mea-
sured in Euro and deflated by the consumer price index from 1986. For the purposes
of this study, the 10th of February, May, August and November were used as quarter
reference dates2. Because the data was originally collected for Social Security purposes,
there are also some disadvantages. The available earnings are right censored; about 15%
of the workers have earnings above the upper censoring level, which varies over time.
The data also does not contain any information about full or part time employment.
However, the focus of this chapter is on income. The censoring may be problem. Yet,
because workers suffer an earnings loss due to the plant closure, the fraction of censored
wages will be larger in the group of non plant closure workers. This means the differ-
ences between the earnings of the plant closure (PC) workers and the non plant closure
(NPC) workers will be attenuated due to the censored earnings.
The ASSD contains no direct information about plant closures. Yet, they can be
constructed by analyzing the size of companies over time. A company is defined as a
plant closure firm at the reference date t when two conditions are satisfied: (i) the firm
disappears3 between the reference dates t and t + 1 and does not re-emerge during the
1For a detailed description of the ASSD see Kuhn and Ruf (2006)
2This setup implies that the data includes only information of the according reference dates.
3A firm disappears from the data, if it has no employees between t and t + 1.
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following year4 (ii) and less than 50% of the employees of a company find a new job
with the same new employer. The latter criterion makes sure that company acquisitions
are not erroneously classified as plant closures. In this chapter a worker counts as a PC
worker at time t when he still works in the plant that goes bankrupt within the next
quarter. That is, all PC workers will be displaced5 within the next three months.
3.2 Sample Design
The aim of this chapter is to analyze the effect of job displacement on the future wage
profile of displaced workers at two different points in the business cycle. Figure 1 shows
the yearly growth rates of the real GDP (solid line) and the unemployment rates (dashed
line), which are used as indicators for the business cycle.
Figure 1
As discussed in the introduction, the two points in time should be selected such that
in one of them the economic situation steadily improves and in the other the economic
conditions continuously deteriorate. In the statistical analyses, both a boom and a
recession is made up of a period of eight consecutive quarters. The period 1987/1988
is followed by 5 years with relatively low unemployment rates (below 6%) and growth
rates of the real GDP above 2%. This point in time, which is followed by a period where
the economy expands relatively rapidly, is selected as the boom period. The period
1991/1992 is followed by six years with unemployment rates above 6%, and four years
with growth rates of the real GDP below 2%6. This time period with relatively higher
unemployment rates and a more slowly expanding economy is selected as the recession
period. Therefore by comparing the earnings losses between the years following the plant
closure, a typical boom period is compared with a typical recession period. For each of
these points in time a sample of workers is generated. Each of these samples contains all
the workers who were employed at least at one quarter reference date in the according
time period. The workers are split up in PC workers and NPC workers. The group of
PC workers contains workers who were employed at least at one of the eight quarter
4This condition is set to one year, because the firm numbers were assigned anew after two years.
That is, under the same firm number a completely new firm may emerge after two years.
5I will use plant closure and displacement as synonyms in this chapter.
6Expect for the year 1994, where the growth rate of the real GDP amounts to 2.4%.
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reference dates in a plant closure firm. The group of NPC workers, used as the control
group, contains workers who have never been employed in a plant closure firm during
the same time period.
The data set includes the quarterly earning profile of each worker over six pre- and
six post-displacement years for both points in time. To ensure that most of the workers
exhibit earnings during this period and to avoid the problem of early retirement7, the
samples are restricted to prime-age workers aged 25-48. To compare the group of workers
between the two points in time, the workers should have comparable costs of displace-
ment. Workers who often change their firms and thus are used to being unemployed and
looking for a new job would be less affected by an unexpected job loss than attached
workers who want to keep their job. Furthermore, workers who leave a distressed firm
before the bankruptcy is apparent, have different earning profiles than worker who stay
until the end (Bowlus and Vilhuber, 2002; Schwerdt, 2005). Accordingly, the sample is
restricted to attached workers, with at least two years of tenure. An additional advan-
tage of this restriction is that workers who are only seasonally unemployed are dropped
too.8 In addition, all observations without information about industry or region were
excluded from the sample.
Table 1 shows the number of PC workers who fullfill the restrictions discussed above,
listed according to the size of their firms. The numbers in parentheses correspond to the
number of the involved firms.9 Up to the size of firms with 100 employees the number
of PC workers does not differ much between boom and recession. But with the bigger
firms come larger differences. In order to have as few differences as possible between
boom and recession, firms with more than 100 employees were excluded. Further, the
employees should have comparable information about the future financial problems of
their company before the plant closure. The smaller a company the better would be
the employees’ information about the imminent bankruptcy of their employer. Thus,
the large group of firms with less than five employees is excluded from the samples. An
7In the ASSD we observe early retirement already for 55 years old worker.
8In Austria there are a lot of seasonal workers. For example, in the constructing industry many
workers are disbanding in the unemployment during the winter because of the smaller volume of orders.
For more detailed information about seasonal workers and the restriction of two years of tenure see Ruf
(2004).
9At first sight it’s confusing that in the firm in the group of 500 - 999 employees only 145 workers
were employed. At second sight, it gets clear that only 145 workers of this firm are aged 25-48 and have
at least two years of tenure.
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other reason why firms with less than five employees were excluded, is that it is difficult
to identify a plant closure for tiny firms. To analyze different earnings losses depend
on the size of the former employer, this article distinguishes between small firms, which
employ between five and nine workers, and large firms, which employ between ten and
one hundred workers.
Table 1
For the empirical analysis a 2% random sample of the NPC workers and all the PC
workers were used. After imposing all the restrictions mentioned in this section there
remain for the boom period: 1,035 (9,596) PC (NPC) workers in the sample of small
firms and 1,167 (37,933) in the sample of large firms. For the recession period: 1,144
(9,640) in the sample of small firms and 1,191 (39,198) in the sample of large firms
3.3 Descriptive Analysis
First, I calculate the average earning differences of the PC workers minus the NPC
workers for the six pre- and the six post-displacement years. The left subfigure of figure
2 shows the average differences for the large firms and the right column those for the
small firms. The differences in earnings are computed on the vertical axis and the years
since displacement on the horizontal axis. The solid lines correspond to the differences
in the boom period whereas the dashed lines correspond to those of the recession period.
Figure 2
In both points in time, workers displaced from large firms earn on average a little
less than the NPC workers during the six pre-displacement years. The differences are
slightly larger during a recession than during a boom. The PC workers suffer a large
earnings loss during the first years; subsequently the difference in earnings to the NPC
workers gets smaller over time. Workers displaced from large firms suffer larger earnings
losses over the whole post-displacement period when the plant closure occurs during a
recession than during a boom.
For workers displaced from small firms the differences in earnings between the PC
workers and the NPC workers is almost zero during the six pre-displacement years. The
path of the earnings losses in the post-displacement years appears similar to the results
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for the large firms. But in contrast to workers displaced from large firms, those displaced
from small firms suffer larger earnings losses over the whole post-displacement period
when the plant closure occurs during a boom than during a recession. Summed up,
during a recession workers suffer larger earnings losses, when they are displaced from
large firms, whereas during a boom the earnings losses are larger for workers displaced
from small firms.
Table 2
Table 2 shows the average characteristics of workers and firms, for each group cor-
respondingly. There are only small differences between the average PC worker and the
average NPC worker. In all the samples PC workers are on average older than the NPC
workers; nevertheless PC workers are less attached to their firms. In the sample of small
firms, seasonal firms10 have a higher probability to go bankrupt at the beginning of a
boom period than non seasonal firms, whereas during a recession there is almost no such
difference. It is unclear, however, whether the ex ante heterogeneity of workers and firms
of the different groups are responsible for the differences found in this section. Therefore,
in the next section, regressions are made which control for these ex ante heterogeneities.
4 Identification and Statistical Models
The aim of this chapter is to determine if earnings losses due to a plant closure depend
on the size of the former employer and the business cycle. To analyze this question the
empirical part distinguishes four groups of workers: those who are (i) employed in large
firms during a recession, (ii) employed in large firms during a boom, (iii) employed in
small firms during a recession and (iv) employed in small firms during a boom. Sub-
section 4.1 discusses how earnings losses are identified. Subsection 4.2 presents separate
regressions, which, on the one hand, are used to estimate the earnings losses for the four
groups and, on the other hand, to estimate the differences in the earnings losses between
boom and recession periods, for large and small firms respectively.
10Seasonal firms includes the building industry and the tourist sector.
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4.1 Identification of the Losses due to Plant Closure
A decline in earnings may result from a combined effect of a decline in wages and a
larger probability to be unemployed. This means that a lower expected income for a
group of workers can be the result of a lower average wage and/or more unemployed
workers with zero income within this group. This can be written as follows:
Egt(earningi) = Egt(wagei|Ui = 0) · Egt(Ui = 0).
Here, earningi corresponds to the earning of individual i in a specific year before or after
displacement. Thus, Egt(earningi) corresponds to the expected earnings of a group of
workers g at time t. This expectation can be written as the product of the expected
wage of all employed workers of group g at time t Egt(wagei|Ui = 0) multiplied with the
expected probability to be employed within this group of workers Egt(Ui = 0). From
here onwards, the effect of the plant closure on the probability to be unemployed will be
called the unemployment probability (UP) effect and the effect on the wage, the wage
effect. For a change in expected wages there are two sources; a selection effect and a net
wage effect. The selection effect occurs because more productive workers with higher
average wages find a new job faster than less productive workers with lower wages. The
net wage effect reflects changes in the wage of a specific worker, wagei, relative to his
average wage of the two years prior to displacement wagei11. This can be written as
follows:
Egt(wagei|Ui = 0) = Egt(wagei|Ui = 0) + Egt(wagei − wagei|Ui = 0).
The variable wagei can be used as a proxy of productivity for this worker (which is not
observed in the ASSD). Changes in Egt(wagei|Ui = 0) are only induced by variations in
the composition of employed workers. This is termed the selection effect. Egt(wagei −
wagei|Ui = 0) captures the net wage decline for employed workers. This is the net wage
effect, which is unaffected by time invariant unobserved individual characteristics.
11During this two years all the individuals are employed, because a tenure of at least two years is
required to be included in the sample.
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4.2 Statistical Models
It is not clear if the ex-ante heterogeneity between workers and their firms is responsible
for the observed differences in average earnings discussed in the descriptive part. To
take this into account, one can estimate the following linear regression model for each
group of workers with:
Wit = α+ (pci · yt)′β + y′tγ + x′iδ + f ′iη + q′iθ + it (1)
where Wit corresponds to one of the variables discussed above. (i.e., earningsit, wagesit,
UPit, wagei or (wageit − wagei)). Earnings and wages are deflated by the average12.
pci is a dummy variable taking on the value one for PC workers and zero otherwise. yt
is a vector of dummy variables representing the years since displacement (from six years
before to six years after displacement). The vector xit includes individual characteristics
like age, age squared, gender, tenure, tenure squared and a dummy variable for blue
collar workers in order to control for the ex-ante heterogeneity of workers. The vector
fit contains firm related characteristics like industry (two digit), size, size squared and
the location of the firm (nine different states, ”Bundesla¨nder”) in order to control for the
ex-ante heterogeneity of firms. The vector qit includes three dummy variables for each
quarter of the reference date where the according workers are defined as PC workers or
NPC workers; the first quarter is the base quarter and thus not included in the regression.
Finally, it is an error term assumed to be independent of observed characteristics. The
time index t identifies the year since displacement and the index i refers to individuals.
The vector of primary interest is β, which captures the differences in the variable of
interest between PC workers and NPC workers over the observation period.
The focus of this chapter lies in the differences in the earnings losses between boom
and recession periods. To directly estimate this difference in difference (DiD) parameter
and to test whether they differ significantly from zero, the samples from boom and
recession periods are merged together and additional regressions are run for each variable
of interest, separately for the sample of small and large firms. The regression has the
12This means that the individual earnings/wages are divided by the average earnings/wages of all
workers at the reference date (i.e. year = 0).
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following form:
Wit = α+ (Ri · pci · yt)′βR + (Ri · yt)′γR + (Ri · xi)′δR + (Ri · fi)′ηR
+(Ri · qi)′θR + (pci · yt)′β + y′tγ + x′iδ + f ′iη + q′iθ + it (2)
Ri is a dummy variable taking on the value one for the recession and the value zero for
the boom. The DID parameter vector βR captures the additional earnings losses for
workers displaced during a recession compared with workers displaced during a boom.
5 Empirical Findings
The descriptive part showed that workers displaced from large firms suffer on average
a larger earnings loss when the displacement occurs during a recession than when it
occurs during a boom. The opposite is true for workers displaced from small firms.
However, these results may be driven by the ex-ante heterogeneity of workers or firms.
The advantage of the regression framework presented above is that it explicitly controls
for such heterogeneity among workers and firms. The estimation results for βR (and the
corresponding t-values) are shown in tables 3 and 413.
In order to better understand the DiD estimates, estimated first differences of all
outcome variables (βˆ in the regression given by specification 1) are presented as well.
Figures 3 and 4 display the results graphically. The differences of each outcome variable
are displayed on the vertical axis and the years since displacement on the horizontal axis.
The year since displacement is marked with an asterisk, when the difference between
boom and recession is statistically significant on the 5% level. The left column of the
subfigures shows the estimated differences for large firms and the right column those for
small firms. The solid line corresponds to the estimated differences from the recession
period and the dashed line to the estimated differences from the boom period. Each
difference between the boom values and the recession values in the subfigures of figure
3 and 4 corresponds to a DiD estimate in table 3 and 4.
13Full regression results are available from the author on request.
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5.1 Main Results
The upper panel of figure 3 shows the estimated earnings losses of displaced workers.
During the first year after plant closure, displaced workers suffer a strong decline in
earnings in the range of 23% to 34%, depending on the size of the former employer and
the business cycle. For all groups of workers the earnings losses get smaller over time
but are still substantially higher than 10% even six years after displacement. The most
striking difference between workers displaced from small firms (subfigure b) and workers
displaced from large firms (subfigure a) is that for the former the earnings losses are
higher during a boom than during a recession, whereas for workers displaced from large
firms the results are the opposite.
Figure 3 and Table 3
As column one of table 3 shows, workers displaced from large firms face an earnings
loss during the first post-displacement year which is 5.3 percentages points (p.p.) higher
if the displacement occurs during a recession rather than during a boom. Six years after
displacement the DiD still amounts to -2.7 p.p.; in other words, workers displaced from
large firms in a recession suffer higher earnings losses than those displaced from large
firms in a boom even in the long run. Workers displaced from small firms suffer earnings
losses which are 4.3 p.p larger when the plant closure occurs during a boom rather than
during a recession (column four of table 3). These DiD estimates decrease over time to
2.7 p.p four years after the displacement. Five years after the displacement the difference
between boom and recession becomes insignificant. This provides first evidence support-
ing the hypothesis that workers displaced from small firms during a boom are treated
differently by the labor market and suffer the highest earnings losses. One explanation
for this finding could be that workers displaced from small firms and seeking new jobs
during a boom carry a negative signal with them due to their displacement.
Interestingly, the results for Austria for the post-displacement years are in line with
the findings of Jacobson et al. (1993) who did similar research with data from Penn-
sylvanian. For all workers the DiD estimates in earnings are insignificant for the six
pre-displacement years.14 This implies that workers have no ex-ante differences in earn-
14The only exception is the significant DiD of -2.7% four years before the displacement for workers
displaced from small firms.
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ings after controlling for individual-specific and firm-specific characteristics, ruling out
a selection explanation.
To identify the source of variation in the earnings losses, I split them up into the
UP effect and the wage effect, accounting for the fact that a decline in earnings for one
specific group of workers can arise either from a higher fraction of unemployed workers
with zero work income or just from lower wages. Subfigure c and d of figure 3show that
one year after displacement PC workers are faced with a 15% to 22% lower probability
to be employed than NPC workers, depending on the size of the former employer and
the business cycle. This is not surprising because, per definition, all PC workers lose
their jobs. The difference in the UP between PC and NPC workers is more than halved
during the second year and then decreases slowly thereafter to about 2.5 % six years
after displacement. Hence, a big part of the large earnings losses during the first post-
displacement year can be explained by the large fraction of PC workers that do not find
a new job immediately.
Column two of table 3 shows that workers displaced from large firms have a 7 p.p.
lower probability to find a new job during the first post-displacement year if the plant
closure occurs during a recession rather than during a boom. This positive DiD in the
UP decreases over time to 1.5 p.p. six years after the displacement. In addition to
the lower probability of finding a new job during the first year, workers displaced from
large firms during a recession earn 1.8 p.p lower wages than those displaced in a boom
(column three of table 3). The positive DiD in wages becomes insignificant after the
second year. Thus the higher earnings losses for workers displaced from large firms in
a recession as opposed to boom are largely driven by the higher fraction of unemployed
workers with zero earnings.
For workers displaced from small firms, things are different, as shown in columns five
and six of table 3. In the first post-displacement year workers displaced in a recession
have better chances of finding a new job than workers displaced in a boom and thus
the according DiD is negative (column five). From the second to the fourth year after
displacement workers displaced in a boom have better chances of finding a new job than
those displaced during a recession. During the following two years the DiD estimates
in the UP becomes insignificant. Therefore, the larger earnings loss during the first
post-displacement year for workers displaced in a boom rather than during a recession is
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due to a combined effect of the higher probability of being unemployed and lower wages.
In following three years the significantly higher earnings losses are mainly driven by the
large wage decline, because the positive DiD in the UP imposes ceteris paribus larger
earnings losses during a recession.
The separation of the earnings losses into a wage effect and an UP effect shows that,
the fact that workers displaced from small firms suffer higher earnings losses during a
boom instead of during a recession is largely due to the large reduction in wage. The same
method shows that the main driving factor of the opposite phenomenon, that workers
displaced from large firms suffer higher earnings losses during a recession as opposed to
during a boom, is the larger fraction of unemployed workers with zero earnings.
Next, I will present the results from the separation of the wage effect into the selection
and the net wage effect. The selection effect picks up differences in the composition
of employed workers and sheds light on two different aspects. First, comparing the
selection effect before and after the plant closure for one specific group of workers helps
to understand if the composition of employed workers within this group is affected by
the plant closure. Second, the estimated DiD between the selection effect during a boom
versus during a recession helps to better understand the DiD estimates found for the
wage effect. A positive DiD of the selection effect indicates that the fraction of re-
employed high wage workers is larger during a recession than during a boom. The net
wage effect at time t captures the individual difference in wage t years after the plant
closure and the average wage in the two pre-displacement years.
Results for the first differences are presented in figure 4. The subfigures a and b of
figure 4 show again the wage effect (the vertical axis is rescaled for better illustration),
and the subfigures c and d show the regression results of wagei, which corresponds
to the selection effect. Finally, the subfigures e and f show the regression results of
(wageit − wagei). This can be interpreted as the net wage effect. The estimated DiD
and the corresponding t-values are given in table 4.
Figure 4 and Table 4
First, I will discuss the results solely for workers displaced from large firms, subse-
quently I will discuss the results for workers displaced only from small firms. Results for
workers displaced from large firms are presented in the subfigures in the left column of
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figure 4 and column one to three in table 4. The results indicate that workers displaced
from large firms suffer a 1.8 p.p larger wage decline during the first post-displacement
year if the plant closure occurs during a boom rather than during a recession (column
1 of table 3. In the second year workers displaced during a recession suffer a stronger
wage decline than workers displaced during a boom, which leads to an insignificant DiD
estimate for wages in the second year. In the last four years there are no significant
differences in the wage effect between workers displaced during a boom versus those
displaced during a recession. Subfigure c shows that over the whole observation period
there are no statistically significant differences in the selection effect between the boom
and the recession. This implies that the composition of PC workers who find a new job is
independent of the business cycle for workers displaced from large firms. Therefore, the
larger wage decline during the first post-displacement year for workers displaced during
a boom is induced by a larger net wage decline (subfigure e). In the last four observed
years there are hardly any differences between boom and recession in the wage effect,
the selection effect and the net wage effect. Therefore, the according DiD estimates are
statistically equal to zero. The wage losses for workers displaced from large firms are
only affected by the business cycle in the short run.
In the pre-displacement years the wage differences between PC and NPC workers
decline slightly over time. One possible explanation for this finding is that large firms try
to avoid an imminent bankruptcy by reducing the wages of their employees. Comparing
the composition of workers (subfigure c) of the last pre-displacement year with the first
post-displacement year shows that, on average, a worker who finds a new job directly
after displacement has had higher wages in the two pre-displacement years than the
average worker in the year directly before the plant closure. In other words, high wage
workers displaced from large firms have somewhat better chances to find a new job
in the first post-displacement year than low wage workers displaced from large firms,
independent of the business cycle.
Now the results for workers displaced from small firms will be discussed, shown in
the subfigures in the right column of figure 4 and the last three columns in table 4.
Workers displaced during a boom suffer a 5 p.p. larger wage decline during the first
year than workers displaced during a recession (column 4 in table 4). Thereafter, the
DiD estimates declines more or less continuously over time to 2 p.p five years after the
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displacement. In contrast to the findings for workers displaced from large firms, workers
displaced from small firms suffer larger wage decline even in the long run if the plant
closure occurs during a boom instead of during a recession.
The findings for the selection effect (subfigure d) show that if the plant closure occurs
during a recession high wage workers find a new job first, whereas during a boom an
average wage worker finds a new job first. This yields a positive estimated DID of
about 2 p.p. for the selection effect from two to six years after the displacement, in
contrast to the findings for workers displaced from large firms. Subfigure f shows that
workers displaced from small firms during a boom suffer a net wage decline of almost
5 p.p. during the first year, but no additional net wage decline during the next five
years. Workers displaced during a recession suffer a yearly wage decline of around 1.2
p.p. during the first four years. The milder net wage decline of workers displaced during
a recession rather than during a boom leads to significant positive DiD estimates in
the net wage effect during the first three years after displacement. The DiD estimates
become insignificant during the last three years.
During the first three post-displacement years, there are two reasons why workers
displaced from small firms during a boom suffer a higher wage loss than those displaced
during a recession. First, high wage workers have a harder time finding a new job if
the plant closure occurs during a boom rather than during a recession. Second, workers
displaced during a boom suffer a higher net wage decline during the first three years
after the plant closure. From the fourth to the sixth post-displacement year the positive
DiD estimates in wages are only due to the fraction of high wage workers who find a
new job first, which is higher during a recession than during a boom.
Again, results indicate that the labor market treats workers displaced from small
firms differently, depending on whether they are displaced during a boom or during a
recession. In the short run all workers displaced during a boom are punished by higher
net wage declines than workers who are displaced during a recession. It seems to be the
case thought that only high wage workers are punished in the long run. Even six years
after displacement, high wage workers displaced during a boom have more problems
finding a new job than high wage workers displaced during a recession. This result may
indicate that high wage workers are held most responsible for the bad performance of
a firm which in turn leads to the plant closure. Low wage workers are also punished
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by larger net wage declines if they are displaced during a boom rather than during a
recession.
Krashinsky (2002) showed that the difference between the earnings losses of laid off
workers compared with the earnings losses of displaced workers found by Gibbons and
Katz (1991) becomes insignificant after one controls for the size of the former and the
new employer. To take this into account, I have run two regressions with the wage as
dependent variable (specification 2) where the size of the new employer is included as an
additional regressor. The results are shown in table 5. The DiD estimates in wages for
workers displaced from large firms are now insignificant over the whole post-displacement
period. The only difference to the results where the size of the new employer is ignored,
is that the DiD coefficient for the first year after displacement is insignificant too. This is
even stronger evidence for the hypothesis that workers displaced from large firms do not
carry a negative signal at all, as suggested by Gibbons and Katz (1991). Conversely, the
DiD estimates for workers displaced from small firms are even larger when one includes
the size of the new employer. In other words, the results found in this chapter are not
affected by the size of the new employer.
6 Conclusions
Most previous empirical studies on plant closure focused on earnings losses at one specific
point in the business cycle. Nakamura (2004) showed for the first time within the
framework of a theoretical model that earnings losses are larger when the plant closure
occurs in a boom period instead of in a recession period. To my knowledge there is no
paper analyzing if there are different effects between workers getting displaced from small
firms compared to large firms. The displacement is a stronger signal about individuals’
productivity for workers getting displaced from small firms than from a large firm.
Furthermore, there are different signals of getting displaced at the beginning of a boom
period than at the beginning of a recession period.
In this chapter, I show that in Austria workers displaced from small firms suffer
significantly higher declines in earnings when they lose their job at the beginning of
a longer boom period than at the beginning of a longer recession period. The larger
earnings losses in boom are hardly driven by the according larger declines in wages.
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This finding goes hand in hand with the findings from Nakamura (2004) for the United
States. For workers getting displaced from large firms the results are opposite. These
displaced workers suffer larger earnings losses when they get displaced at the beginning
of a recession period. The difference between the boom and the recession is strongly
driven by large differences in the UP, in contrast to the findings for small firms where
the UP effect does not depend on the business cycle.
Separating the wage effect in a selection effect and a net wage effect gives evidence
that workers displaced from small firms in boom get punished. Moreover it seems that
high wage workers get punished heavier than low wage workers. For displaced workers
from large firms and from small firms in recession there seems to be no such punishment.
This is evidence that these workers do not carry a bad signal from the displacement, as
proposed by Gibbons and Katz (1991).
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A Appendix
Figure 1: Business cycle
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Figure 2: Average differences in earnings over time
−
20
0
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
50
0
−6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Years since displacement
boom reccession
Large firms
−
20
0
−
15
0
−
10
0
−
50
0
−6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Years since displacement
boom reccession
Small firms
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
25
Figure 3: Conditional differences over time
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Table 1: Number of displaced workers by the size of their company
Size of firm Number of PC workers
boom recession
1 - 4 5’977 (5’203) 6’082 (5’337)
5 - 9 1’035 (472) 1’144 (509)
10 - 19 582 (135) 621 (155)
20 - 49 449 (55) 466 (55)
50 - 99 167 (8) 223 (12)
100 - 199 119 (2) 13 (1)
200 - 499 40 (1) 0 (0)
500 - 999 0 (0) 145 (1)
1000 + 0 (0) 591 (1)
Notes: The values in parentheses correspond to the number of firms.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
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Table 3: Difference in differences: earnings, UP and wages
Sample Large firms Small firms
Dep. Variable Earnings UP Wages Earnings UP Wages
Year -6 -0.013 0.07 % 0.005 -0.009 0.00 % -0.013
(1.62) (0.23) (0.78) (0.87) (0.01) (1.51)
Year -5 -0.003 0.58 % 0.006 -0.018 0.73 % -0.005
(0.36) (1.89) (0.90) (1.79) (2.05)* (0.63)
Year -4 -0.006 1.10 % -0.002 -0.027 -0.09 % -0.003
(0.77) (3.60)** (0.33) (2.68)** (0.25) (0.38)
Year -3 0.002 0.38 % -0.004 -0.010 0.40 % 0.006
(0.24) (1.25) (0.63) (1.01) (1.12) (0.73)
Year -2 0.010 -0.49 % -0.004 0.001 -0.14 % 0.001
(1.27) (1.61) (0.65) (0.08) (0.39) (0.13)
Year -1 0.007 -0.32 % -0.000 0.007 -0.48 % 0.003
(0.83) (1.05) (0.01) (0.69) (1.33) (0.44)
Reference date 0.001 -0.40 % -0.007 0.002 -0.11 % -0.003
(0.08) (0.66) (0.58) (0.11) (0.16) (0.23)
Year 1 -0.053 7.12 % 0.018 0.043 -0.82 % 0.050
(6.61)** (23.33)** (2.69)** (4.19)** (2.29)* (5.32)**
Year 2 -0.034 5.21 % -0.001 0.039 2.20 % 0.042
(4.25)** (17.05)** (0.13) (3.84)** (6.14)** (4.72)**
Year 3 -0.036 3.83 % -0.004 0.034 1.89 % 0.032
(4.43)** (12.55)** (0.69) (3.39)** (5.27)** (3.63)**
Year 4 -0.030 2.88 % -0.003 0.027 0.60 % 0.018
(3.71)** (9.42)** (0.41) (2.67)** (1.69) (2.05)*
Year 5 -0.024 2.24 % -0.007 0.016 -0.11 % 0.020
(3.02)** (7.34)** (1.11) (1.60) (0.31) (2.23)*
Year 6 -0.027 1.53 % -0.007 0.016 -0.41 % 0.013
(3.30)** (5.00)** (1.01) (1.54) (1.14) (1.41)
Observations 4113911 4120802 3704037 1094892 1096914 956995
R2 0.23 0.02 0.31 0.19 0.03 0.28
Notes: **, * denotes significance at the 1% , 5% level respectively. T-values in parentheses. UP is the
unemployment probability times 100.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
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Table 4: Difference in differences: wages, selection effect, net wage effect
Sample Large firms Small firms
Dep. Variable Wages SEa NWEb Wages SEa NWEb
Year -6 0.005 -0.004 0.009 -0.013 0.007 -0.019
(0.78) (0.64) (2.63)** (1.51) (0.85) (4.32)**
Year -5 0.006 -0.001 0.006 -0.005 0.004 -0.010
(0.90) (0.16) (2.01)* (0.63) (0.55) (2.15)*
Year -4 -0.002 -0.004 0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.000
(0.33) (0.76) (0.73) (0.38) (0.36) (0.07)
Year -3 -0.004 -0.006 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.003
(0.63) (1.06) (0.69) (0.73) (0.34) (0.75)
Year -2 -0.004 -0.007 0.003 0.001 -0.001 0.002
(0.65) (1.22) (0.93) (0.13) (0.12) (0.46)
Year -1 -0.000 -0.005 0.005 0.003 0.000 0.003
(0.01) (0.97) (1.71) (0.44) (0.07) (0.71)
Reference date -0.007 -0.006 -0.001 -0.003 -0.000 -0.003
(0.58) (0.53) (0.16) (0.23) (0.02) (0.39)
Year 1 0.018 0.001 0.017 0.050 0.013 0.037
(2.69)** (0.22) (4.73)** (5.32)** (1.49) (7.29)**
Year 2 -0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.042 0.018 0.023
(0.13) (0.22) (0.65) (4.72)** (2.22)* (4.90)**
Year 3 -0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0.032 0.021 0.011
(0.69) (0.15) (1.06) (3.63)** (2.51)* (2.36)*
Year 4 -0.003 0.002 -0.004 0.018 0.025 -0.007
(0.41) (0.27) (1.25) (2.05)* (2.99)** (1.43)
Year 5 -0.007 0.003 -0.010 0.020 0.024 -0.004
(1.11) (0.44) (2.87)** (2.23)* (2.81)** (0.80)
Year 6 -0.007 -0.001 -0.004 0.013 0.022 -0.010
(1.01) (0.16) (1.15) (1.41) (2.58)** (1.91)
Observations 3704037 3704037 3704037 956995 956995 956995
R2 0.32 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.23
Notes: **, * denotes significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively. T-values in parentheses.
UP is the unemployment probability * 100. (a) SE reports the selection effect given by wage. (b)
NWE reports the net wage effect given by (wagei − wagei)
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
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Table 5: DiD Wages, including the size of the new employer
Sample Large firms Small firms
Dep. Variable Wages Wages
Year -6 -0.003 -0.003
(0.45) (0.31)
Year -5 -0.002 0.004
(0.28) (0.46)
Year -4 -0.006 0.003
(0.86) (0.36)
Year -3 -0.007 0.016
(1.10) (1.85)
Year -2 -0.006 0.010
(0.85) (1.26)
Year -1 -0.003 0.013
(0.40) (1.61)
Reference Date -0.009 0.005
(0.72) (0.32)
Year 1 0.007 0.058
(0.96) (5.65)**
Year 2 -0.004 0.052
(0.56) (5.40)**
Year 3 -0.008 0.041
(1.10) (4.27)**
Year 4 -0.006 0.030
(0.77) (3.08)**
Year 5 -0.008 0.034
(1.06) (3.43)**
Year 6 -0.008 0.019
(1.09) (1.83)
Obs. 3704037 956995
R2 0.31 0.27
Notes: **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% level respectively. T-
values in parentheses. UP is the unemployment probability times 100.
Source: Own calculations based on ASSD.
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